Toward a Scotistic Modal Metaphysics :: Philosophy Philosophical Essays

Toward a Scotistic Modal MetaphysicsABSTRACT The problem I play in this essay is Do we have in Scotus a modal logic or a counterpart theory? We need to take a rather roundabout path to handle this problem. This is because, whether it be in Lewiss original formulation or in others applications, the crucial concept of counterpart has never been clearly explicated. In section two, I shall therefore examine the recent controversy concerning Leibnizs find outs on modalities which centers around the counterpart relation. By fully exploiting the lessons learned from such an examination, I shall thus launch a trilemma against a Leibnizian in section three. Section four shall make the claim that unlike Leibnizs case, Scotuss position is not endangered by the trilemma. One important premise will be adopted from my thesis presented elsewhere regarding the different between Scotuss haecceitas and Leibnizs individual essence. Another will be secured from a brief report on Scotuss views on simi larity, which might be utterly original to modern eyes jaundiced by contemporary set theories.1. The riddle Scotistic Modal Logic vs. Scotistic Counterpart TheoryThanks to the resurgence of interest in modalities in the twentieth century, the history of modal logic has been studied more than extensively than ever. One of the more important lessons is that Scotus rather than Leibniz is the father of the modern conception of logical possibility. (1) Insofar as it is not merely historical wonder but a test of our intuition about modalities that we are interested in the predecessors of modern modal logic, we face the urgent task of reconstructing the Scotistic system of modalities. In fact,Douglas C. Langston recently raised an interesting question as to which way of understanding possible worlds Scotus might endorse the counterpart view or the canonical view? Based on Ordinatio, Book I, d. 44, q. 1, n. 11, he presents two alternative readings. Ultimately, however, he opts for the co unterpart reading on the ground that it is more consistent with Scotuss remarks on how graven image knows contingents. An important consequence from the counterpart reading is that individuals are world-bound for Scotus. (2) Yet Langstons interpretation invites serious criticism. According to Simo Knuuttila, if the individuals in Scotuss model were world-bound, they would not have synchronic de re alternatives, which is not compatible with Scotuss reform in obligational principles. Knuuttila further points out that Scotuss well-known doctrine of human free will excludes the possibility of world-bound individuals.